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Criminal Law-Due Process-Statute Proscribing Loitering for
the Purpose of Prostitution Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague.
People v. Smith, 88 Misc. 2d 590, 388 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Crim. Ct.
1976), rev'd 393 N.Y.S.2d 229 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1977).
At approximately 2:15 a.m. on July 12, 1976, a police officer ob-
served' defendant female converse with two male passersby.2 Soon
thereafter, defendant conversed with a third male with whom she
entered a building known to accomodate prostitutes and their clien-
tele. The two left the building a short time later.' Defendant Smith
was arrested and charged with violating section 240.37 of the New
York Penal Law, which prohibits loitering for the purpose of prosti-
tution.4 Following Ms. Smith's arrest, the court determined after a
preliminary hearing that there was reasonable cause to believe that
she had violated section 240.37.1
After indictment but before trial, defendant moved for a dismissal
of the charge. Ms. Smith asserted that the statute is vague, over-
broad and inhibits free speech.' The Criminal Court of the City of
New York agreed with all of the defendant's contentions and
granted the motion to dismiss.7 The court held that the statute,
insofar as it sanctioned detention on the basis of suspicion, infringed
upon defendant's Fourth Amendment protection against arrest ex-
cept for probable cause.'
The appellate term reversed,' and upheld the constitutionality of
the statute: "the language used in the statute is sufficiently plain
1. People v. Smith, 88 Misc. 2d 590, 388 N.Y.S.2d 221, (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 393
N.Y.S.2d 239 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1977). Defendant was observed by the arresting officer and
his partner for approximately twenty minutes. Id. at 591, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 222. The arresting
officer knew that Ms. Smith had previously been arrested for prostitution. 393 N.Y.S.2d at
240. The incident occured on Eighth Avenue between 40th and 45th street in New York City.
This area is notorious for its high incidence of prostitution. 88 Misc. 2d at 591, 388 N.Y.S.2d
at 222.
2. Defendant was seen touching each man's arm, saying something to him and each
continued on his way. 88 Misc. 2d at 591, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
3. The arresting officer conversed with the third party and subsequently arrested the
defendant for loitering for the purpose of prostitution. 393 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
4. N.Y. PENAL LAw §240.37 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
5. 393 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
6. 88 Misc. 2d at 591, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
7. Id. at 601, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
8. Id. 388 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
9. 393 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
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as to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to understand precisely
what acts are proscribed."' 10 The court determined that under the
statute, the arresting officer may not exercise unfettered discretion
in determining the illegality of certain conduct."I Finally, the court
dismissed defendant's argument that the statute violated the first
amendment right to freedom of speech.'2
Loitering statutes were originally conceived as a method to pre-
vent unemployed laborers from wandering between towns and ter-
rorizing travelers. 3 The modern rationale behind the statutes is the
prevention of minor offenses in areas frequented by the public."
Section 240.37 of the New York Penal Law became effective on July
11, 1976, one day before the opening of the Democratic National
Convention.' 5 The section states:'" "Any person who remains or
wanders about in a public place and repeatedly beckons to, or re-
peatedly stops . . . , [or] repeatedly attempts to engage passers-
by in conversation. . . for the purpose of prostitution, or of patron-
ising a prostitute . . . shall be guilty of a violation . . .,.1
10. Id. at 240.
11. Id. at 240-41.
12. Id. at 243.
13. United States ex rel Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1171-72 (2d Cir. 1974), off'd,
420 U.S. 283 (1975).
14. People v. Nowak, 46 App. Div.2d 469, 471, 363 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144 (4th Dep't 1975).
15. N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.37 (McKinney Supp. 1976) (Practice Commentary). Under
§240.35 of the New York Penal Law, a person is guilty of loitering when he:
"1. loiters ... in a public place for the purpose of begging; or 2. loiters. . . in a public
place for the purpose of gambling .. . ; or 3. loiters . . . in a public place for the
purpose of engaging, or solicitating . . . deviate sexual intercourse . . .; or 4. loiters
[while] being masked or in any manner disguised .. .; or 5. loiters . . . in or about
a school, college or university, not having. . . any. . . specific, legitimate reason for
being there . . .; or 6. loiters . . . in or about a place without apparent reason and
under circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged ...in crime,
and, upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to identify himself. . .; or 7. loiters ...
in any transportation facility ...for the purpose of soliciting or engaging in any
business, trade or commercial transaction . . .; or 8. loiters. . . in any transportation
facility, or is found sleeping therein, and is unable to give a satisfactory explanation
of his presence ..."
Section 240.36 of the New York Penal Law makes loitering for the purpose of unlawfully using
or possessing a controlled substance a class B misdemeanor. N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.36
(McKinney, Supp. 1976).
16. N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.37(2) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
17. Id. Section 240.37(1) defines a "public place" as "any street, sidewalk, bridge, alley
or alleyway . . . parking lot or transportation facility ...." Section 240.37(3) makes loiter-
ing for the purpose of promoting prostitution a class A misdemeanor. N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.37
(McKinney Supp. 1976).
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The New York State Legislature found that "loitering for the
purpose of prostitution . . . is disruptive of the public peace..."
because it "interfere[s] with the use and enjoyment . . .of public
places"'" by others and with the individual's right to privacy. The
legislation was based on the following goals: maintaining the use
and enjoyment of public places and upgrading the community and
commercial life of certain neighborhoods.'"
Loitering statutes potentially suffer from several related constitu-
tional infirmities. A loitering statute is often drafted in vague termi-
nology.20 If such a law is indefinite in specifying the condemned or
proscribed act,2' or if it fails to provide a guide as to what conduct
must be done or avoided so that ordinary members of society can
comply with its requirements, it will be declared void for vague-
ness." In addition, a loitering statute may be drafted in such a way
as to be overbroad, proscribing conduct otherwise constitutionally
protected.3
Two notable Supreme Court cases illustrate these related doc-
trines. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,24 eight defendants
were convicted25 of violating that city's vagrancy ordinance." The
police had arrested several defendants because they stopped near a
used car lot which had been previously burglarized.Y Another defen-
18. N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.37 (Legislative Findings). The commentary that accompanies
§240.37 illustrates the dissatisfaction that many civil libertarians feel toward the statute. It
notes that "[Ilts obvious purpose was to inhibit prostitution activity around the convention
site in Midtown Manhattan. After a week the convention delegates and visitors were gone
but the statute lingers on .... "
19. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 344.
20. E.g. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); People v. Berck, 32
N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); People v.
Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 151 N.E.2d 871, 176 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1958).
21. U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); People v. Esteves, 85 Misc.2d 217, 378
N.Y.S.2d 920 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1976).
22. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. at 162 n.20; Coates v. City of Cincinatti,
402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 546 (1971).
23. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
24. Id.
25. Four defendants were arrested and charged with vagrancy and prowling by auto. Two
others were arrested for loitering and being common thieves. The last defendant was charged
with vagrancy and disorderly loitering on the street. Id. at 158.
26. The Jacksonville city ordinance stated "Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons
who go about begging . . . persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without
any lawful purpose or object . . . shall be deemed vagrants . . . . Id. at 156-57 n. 1.
27. Id. at 158-59.
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dant was arrested because he walked on the same few streets several
times while allegedly waiting for a friend.28 The Supreme Court held
that the ordinance denied defendants due process of law,29 stating
that the activities in question, viz. walking about and driving from
place to place, "are historically part of the amenities of life as we
have known them. '30
The Jacksonville city ordinance was written in vague and archaic
terms .3 No standards governing the exercise of police discretion
were delineated. Thus the Court reasoned that the ordinance as
applied, subjected the defendants to arbitrary arrest. 31
Similarly, in Palmer v. City of Euclid,34 defendant was convicted
of violating Euclid's suspicious person ordinance. Defendant
stopped his car in a parking lot late at night. A female left the car
and entered a nearby apartment house. Defendant then left the lot,
parked his car on the street and used a two-way radio. He was
subsequently arrested .3 According to the United States Supreme
Court, insofar as the record revealed, appellant's actions were quite
visible.3 7 There was no suggestion that his acts were unlawful?.3 The
Court stated that "no man shall be held criminally responsible for
conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be pro-
scribed." 3
In determining the constitutionality of its loitering statutes, con-
sistently with United States Supreme Court decisions, New York
courts have applied these three doctrines of vagueness, overbreadth
and protection against arrest except on probable cause. In the land-
mark case of People v. Berck,40 the New York Court of Appeals
28. Id.
29. Id. at 162.
30. Id. at 164.
31. See note 26 supra.
32. 405 U.S. at 165.
33. Id. at 160.
34. 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
35. Id. The ordinance was similar to N.Y. Penal Law §240.35 (6) (McKinney 1967) which
was declared unconstitutional in People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347
N.Y.S.2d 33, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
36. 402 U.S. at 545.
37. Id. at 546.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
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determined that the statute in issue represented a violation of due
process because the statute was not sufficiently clear to give fair
warning to a citizen.4 The statute42 declared that a person is guilty
when he "loiters . . in or about a place without apparent reason
and under circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be
engaged in a crime and upon inquiry by a police officer, refuses to
identify .himself."' 3
In Berck, the police knew that a certain residential building
would be temporarily unoccupied. While on patrol, an officer saw
defendant examining the residence. When questioned, defendant
refused to identify himself or explain what he was doing." The court
of appeals, stating that this was arrest on suspicion alone, 5 held
that the statute "is not informative on its face and utterly fails to
give adequate notice of the behavior it forbids."'" The statute did
not condemn any identifiable acts or ommissions to act that would
restrict its application to specific circumstances.
In another landmark case, People v. Pagnotta,'7 the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of section 240.36 of
the New York Penal Law. 8 This section forbids loitering for the
purpose of using any narcotic drug. 9 The arresting officer, knowing
that defendant was a drug addict, observed him with two compan-
ions as the three were about to inject themselves hypodermically
with a narcotic.5" The court of appeals upheld the arrest and the
statute, concluding that "the statute does not penalize mere loiter-
ing . . . but rather prohibits loitering for the purpose of committing
the crime of unlawfully using or possessing narcotic drugs." '51
In a later case, People v. Willmott,5 a Suffolk County court fur-
ther developed the distinction between mere loitering and loitering
41. 32 N.Y.2d at 569, 300 N.E.2d at 412, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
42. N.Y. Penal Law §240.35 (6) (McKinney, 1962).
43. Id.
44. 32 N.Y.2d at 575, 300 N.E.2d at 416, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
45. Id. at 572, 300 N.E.2d at 413, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
46. Id. at 569, 300 N.E.2d at 413, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
47. 25 N.Y.2d at 333, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1969).
48. Id. at 338, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
49. N.Y. Penal Law §240.36 (McKinney, 1976).
50. 25 N.Y.2d at 335, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
51. Id. at 338, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
52. 67 Misc.2d 709, 324 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Village J. Ct. 1971).
1971).
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for a particular purpose. Defendant was convicted of loitering to
solicit deviate sexual intercourse. 3 The court held that the statute
was not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad stating:54
"Whenever a conviction for loitering has been upheld, it is because
the statute uses the term 'loiter' . . . to point up the prohibited act,
either actual or threatened."5 Loitering statutes have also been
upheld when they are enforceable solely in an area which is noto-
rious for illegal conduct.56
In the instant case,5" the New York City Criminal Court held that,
because section 240.37 fails to describe adequately the proscribed
conduct,5" the arresting officer lacks a statutory guide to follow in
determining whether a "person who remains or wanders about" is
in fact loitering for the purpose of prostitution. Thus, the statute
authorizes an arrest on suspicion rather than on probable cause. A
person, especially a woman, lost and seeking directions can conceiv-
ably be arrested for violating the statute."
The lower court held that defendant's first amendment right of
freedom of speech had been violated.6' Although the statute is not
directed against speech, the prostitute must speak in order to ac-
complish the prohibited act.6" The United States Supreme Court
has held that the right of free speech is not an absolute and may be
regulated when the words are of a lewd or obscene nature. 3 Justice
Altman held that the language of the statute "forces the police
officer to judge which language is obscene." 4 The officer also deter-
mines whether the action of the individual outweighs any reasona-
ble possibility that the conversation is innocent. Thus, the judg-
53. Id. at 710, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
54. Id. at 711, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 615-19.
55. Id. at 711, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
56. See People v. Merolla, 9 N.Y.2d 62 (1961). Defendants was convicted of loitering in
an area notorious at the time for a high incidence of illegal conduct: the waterfront.
57. 88 Misc. 2d 590, 388 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 393 N.Y.S.2d 239
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1977).
58. Id. at 592, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 222-23, quoting N.Y. Penal Law §240.37(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1976).
59. Id. at 600, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
60. Id., 388 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
61. Id. at 597, 601, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 226, 228.
62. Id. at 597, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
63. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1943).
64. 88 Misc. 2d at 597, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
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ment of the arresting officer becomes paramount.
The lower court compared the facts in Smith with the facts in
People v. Pagnotta.65 It stated that the statute8 challenged in
Pagnotta (loitering for the purpose of unlawfully using or possessing
a narcotic drug) had definable limits that could withstand constitu-
tional attack. 7 Further, the totality of the circumstances in
Pagnotta clearly illustrated that the defendant was loitering for a
particular purpose."8 The implements for taking drugs were present
and the arresting officer saw defendant preparing to use a narcotic."
In the instant case, the officer did not hear the content of the con-
versation between defendant Smith and the males.70 He could only
suppose that defendant's conversations were in regard to commit-
ting the proscribed act.7' In short, section 240.37 engenders cases
that upon their facts, would pose difficult questions as to whether
certain conduct is criminal.
The appellate term72 held that the challenged statute does not
place unfettered discretion in the hands of the arresting officer.73
"[T]he statute . . . does not define [the] guilt of the offense in
terms of what is in the police officer's mind. To the contrary, it
defines the crime in terms of the acts committed by the defendant,
and her purpose in committing those acts as determined by the trier
of fact. 74 The court reasoned that specific acts were prohibited by
the statute: stopping and interfering with passersby and repeatedly
beckoning. The trier of fact can determine whether these actions
have occured. 5 Moreover, "[t]he law frequently imposes upon po-
lice officers the obligation of determining, at least ab initio, whether
the offense is being committed, and whether conduct which might
appear innocent to a layman is in fact criminal."7
The appellate court rejected the lower court's holding that section
65. 25 N.Y.2d 333, 300 N.E.2d 411, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1973).
66. N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.35 (9) (McKinney 1976).
67. 88 Misc. 2d at 599, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
68. Id., 388 N.Y.2d at 227. See also notes 47-51 supra.
69. 88 Misc. 2d at 599, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
70. Id. 388 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
71. Id.
72. See note 57 supra.
73. 393 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
74. Id. at 241.
75. Id. at 242.
76. Id.
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240.37 inhibits freedom of speech and that a valid conviction under
the statute is not possible." "[Slince section 240.37 prohibits only
such communication which is 'for the purpose' of criminal activity
it does not infringe on first amendment rights. ... 78 A valid con-
viction is possible under the statute as "[elven where evidence of
guilt is wholly circumstantial such evidence will support a convic-
tion where common human experience would lead a reasonable
man, putting his mind to it, [to] reject or accept inferences as-
serted for the established fact."7.
The appellate court's analysis followed closely the analysis"° em-
ployed by two other jurisdictions in construing loitering for the pur-
pose of prostitution statutes. In Morgan v. City of Detroit,8 plaintiff
was convicted of violating Detroit's "accosting and soliciting" ordi-
nance. The statute made unlawful the act of any "person to accost,
solicit or invite another in any public place . . .to commit . . .
fornication . . . or prostitution . "... 5 Plaintiff challenged the
ordinance on the grounds that it violated due process of law."3 In
ruling on plaintiff's contention that the ordinance was so vague and
overbroad as to be violative of the due process clause, the court
77. Id. at 243.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Litigants in other jurisdictions have posed novel arguments in attempting to overturn
the constitutionality of loitering statutes. In United States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1975), defendant was charged with soliciting for prostitution in violation of a District
of Columbia statute which provided, "[iut shall not be lawful for any person to invite, entice
[or] persuade . . . for the purpose of prostitution . . ." Id. at 48 n. 1. A District of Columbia
trial court found that the statute was invalid as an unconstitutional invasion of defendant's
right of privacy, stating that a woman has the right to "the use of [her] own body." 339 A.2d
at 50. Defendant further contended that the statute violated her right to freedom of speech,
The court held "prostitution per se is not unlawful .. .[and] that a prostitute's offer to
engage in a commercial sexual act must be protected speech." Id. at 51.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's holdings. It rejected
the right of privacy argument since the right had only encompassed personal rights and the
intimacies of the home. Id. at 50. Ruling on the first amendment claim, the court stated that
"solicitation for prostitution is a unique type of speech ... and can be reasonably regulated
with the permissible exercise of the police power." Id. at 54.
81. 389 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
82. Id. at 926.
83. Id. at 929. Plaintiff also contended that the statute violated her right of privacy. The
District Court rejected the argument stating that the right of privacy "prohibits the state
from proscribing activity conducted in private between consenting individuals ... " 389 F.
Supp. at 926. The crime of accosting and soliciting is not consensual "since the party accosted
or solicited cannot by definition have yet consented .. " Id.
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stated that [t]he terms 'accosting and soliciting,' 'prostitution' and
'fornication' are on their face precise and give fair notice of what
conduct is forbidden."8 4
In City of Seattle v. Jones,85 the Supreme Court of Washington
held that an ordinance which made it unlawful for anyone to "loiter
in or near any thoroughfare or place open to the public . . . under
circumstances manifesting the purpose of inducing, enticing, solic-
iting . . . an act of prostitution.", 5 was not void for vagueness. In
Jones,7 the police observed appellant female conversing with uni-
dentified males. As the police approached, appellant started to run.
She was arrested for violating that city's loitering for the purpose
of prostitution ordinance.8
Appellant contended that the ordinance was void because it was
so vague and indefinite." The court affirmed appellant's conviction
stating that the language was clear and unambiguous. "The ordi-
nance is sufficiently clear so that men of reasonable understanding
are not required to guess at the meaning of the enactment." 0
Loitering for the purpose of prostitution statutes can withstand
constitutional attack if they are drafted in clear and concise termi-
nology. New York Penal Law section 240.37 represents the Legisla-
ture's latest attempt to ameliorate the ongoing problem of prostitu-
tion. Notwithstanding its constitutionality, the social ramifications
of enforcement may have created greater problems than those
solved. As one commentator has stated: "Having labored mightily
and brought forth only this simplistic attempt to deal with a compli-
cated social problem, the Legislature can take little pride in its
accomplishments. Whether or not is is [ultimately] declared un-
constitutional by the courts, its early repeal would reflect more
credit on the Legislature than did its passage.''91
Sayde J Markowitz
84. Id. at 929.
85. 79 Wash.2d 626, 488 P.2d 750 (1971).
86. Id. at 626, 628, 488 P.2d at 751-52.
87. Id. at 626, 488 P.2d 750.
88. Id. at 626, 628, 488 P.2d at 751-52.
89. Id., 488 P.2d at 750.
90. Id. at 626, 488 P.2d at 752.
91. N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.37 (McKinney Supp. 1976) (Practice Commentary).
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